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Sección Artículos
The role of federal transfers in regional convergence 
in human development indicators in Argentina *
Marcelo Capello A, C, Alberto Figueras A, Sebastián Freille A, B , Pedro Moncarz A
ABSTRACT: We analyse regional convergence between Argentine provinces in 
well-being indicators for the period 1970-2001. More specifically, we examine 
the role of regional public policy in reducing the development gap between the 
provinces. We find strong evidence of conditional convergence in well-being indi-
cators. However, we find no evidence that redistributive transfers from the federal 
government to the provinces have had a positive effect on convergence in these 
indicators. In fact, we find that for some schooling, health and housing measures, 
the effect of federal transfers on improvement rates might have been contrary to 
what was expected.
Classification JEL: H77; O15. 
Keywords: Regional convergence; Human development; Fiscal transfers; Argen-
tina. 
Efectos de las transferencias federales sobre la convergencia regional  
en indicadores de desarrollo humano en Argentina
RESUMEN: Se analiza la convergencia regional entre las provincias argentinas 
en indicadores de bienestar para el periodo 1970-2001. En particular, se estudia el 
rol de la política pública regional en la reducción de la brecha de desarrollo entre 
provincias. Los resultados muestran una fuerte evidencia de convergencia condi-
cional en indicadores de bienestar. Sin embargo, no se encuentra evidencia que las 
transferencias redistributivas desde el gobierno federal hacia las provincias hayan 
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tenido un efecto positivo sobre la convergencia de estos indicadores. Más aun, se 
obtiene que para algunos indicadores de educación, salud y vivienda, el efecto 
de las transferencias federales podría haber sido el opuesto al que se esperaría. 
Clasificación JEL: H77; O15. 
Palabras clave: Convergencia regional; desarrollo humano; transferencias fisca-
les; Argentina.
1. Background and motivation
One of the central goals of a federal form of government is to help ease the 
regional disparities in social and economic outcomes between the sub-national ju-
risdictions. To this end, most federal countries have specific financial arrangements 
between the different tiers of government aimed at ensuring homogeneous levels 
of public goods provision across the different jurisdictions. In most cases, these ar-
rangements involve some form of tax-sharing and intergovernmental transfers ac-
cording to different criteria but usually there are both devolutive and redistributive 
considerations 1. An important question is whether these intergovernmental financial 
arrangements are in fact bridging the development gap between rich and poor re-
gions. In this paper we examine the impact of decentralized public policy on regional 
development by focusing on its effect on a set of well-being indicators rather than on 
economic performance measures. 
Our contribution is twofold: firstly, unlike previous studies for Argentina, we 
analyse regional convergence in measures of well-being and human development 
rather than focusing on economic performance; and secondly, we analyse the effect 
of decentralized fiscal policy on regional convergence (or the lack thereof) across 
regions in well-begin indicators. 
1 Most federal countries have designed specific schemes for articulating financial linkages between 
the different levels of government in multi-tiered systems. In Brazil, both regional states and munici-
palities receive transfers from the federal government. In Australia, federal transfers are critical to state 
budgets representing as much as 50% of total revenues. The largest transfer is that corresponding to the 
proceeds of the goods and services tax (GST) followed by other specific transfers. Similarly, the uncondi-
tional Equalization Transfer in Canada accounts for more than 80% of total federal transfers to the prov-
inces. In Argentina, by and large intergovernmental fiscal relations are channelled through the Régimen de 
Coparticipación Impositiva which introduces criteria for vertical —primary—and horizontal —second-
ary— distribution of funds. Not only federal countries have inter-governmental financial arrangements in 
place. Non-federal, fiscally decentralised countries have often similar arrangements between the central 
government and the territorial or local units. This is the case of Colombia a politically-unitary country 
whose territorial divisions —departamentos and municipios— receive earmarked transfers from the na-
tional government to finance decentralized spending. Another country where the role of transfers from the 
central government has become increasingly important is China, particularly after the introduction of the 
Tax-Sharing System (TSS) reform in 1994 which was aimed at improving the efficiency of sub-national 
spending and reducing horizontal inequalities. Other unitary countries like Portugal and Chile have also 
increased their degree of fiscal decentralization in recent years. 
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While this topic has often attracted the attention of scholars, it has only in recent 
years become more actively researched due to several reasons. Firstly, the fact that 
several countries have moved towards more fiscally decentralized schemes in the last 
30 years has prompted scholars to analyse this topic in more detail. Additionally, the 
growing importance of regions as clusters of economic activity has also highlighted 
the relevance of inter-governmental financial relations. Finally, although only a small 
number of countries are de-iure federations, they use up around half of the earth’s 
surface area and their citizens make up more than 40% of the world’s population 2. 
Furthermore, a large part of the literature is focused on studying the economic and 
political determinants of federal transfers while the strand that focuses on the eco-
nomic and social effects of transfers has been given less attention. Our paper contrib-
utes to this latter literature by means of investigating the role of federal transfers in 
regional convergence across a wide range of social and well-being indicators. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section surveys some related lit-
erature. Section 3 provides a brief background of the system of inter-governmental 
financial arrangements in Argentina. Section 4 describes some of the theoretical in-
sights that motivate the choice of our approach. In section 5 we describe the method-
ology, data and analyse the distributional dynamics of the selected indicators. Section 
6 lays out the econometric specification and proceeds to estimation of the baseline 
models. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Related literature
The relationship between federal transfers and economic convergence –conver-
gence in GDP- has been profusely studied in the empirical literature. Coulombe and 
Lee (1995, 1998) and Kaufman et al. (2003) find a positive effect of transfers on con-
vergence for Canadian provinces while Rodriguez (2006) finds no significant effect. 
The evidence is not conclusive for the Australian case either. While Ramakrishnan and 
Cerisola (2004) conclude that there is no significant impact of transfers on convergence 
in economic outcomes during the 90’s decade, Rangarajan and Srivastava (2004) find 
that transfers are associated with regional economic convergence. In a recent study, 
Martínez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2010) find a negative effect of federal transfers on 
regional economic convergence in the Russian Federation. Similarly, Bagchi (2003) 
finds that regional disparities have increased in India during the last 50 years de-
spite the persistence of federal transfers to the regions. Some recent studies (Maciel 
et al., 2008; de Oliveira, 2008) suggest that transfers to states and municipalities have 
had a positive effect on the process of regional convergence in Brazil 3. Other studies 
2 This recent interest on the effect of inter-governmental transfers has also been fuelled by the ex-
periences of some of the most heavily populated countries which, are either federal by law (India and the 
Russian Federation) or share some trademark federalist traits.
3 It should be noted, however, that while convergence across Brazilian regions seems to have taken 
place at different sub periods in recent decades, there is no evidence of long-term trend towards regional 
convergence.
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have examined the role of transfers on regional convergence in quasi-federal countries 
—i.e. similar to de-facto federations—. Recent contributions include work on China 
by Shuanyou and Hongxia (2003), Heng (2008), and Candelaria et al. (2009) which 
find that inter-governmental transfers have not been beneficial towards easing regional 
inequalities in recent decades. Ferreira Dias and Silva (2004) finds no significant as-
sociation between central transfers and regional convergence for Portugal. 
There are several empirical studies on regional economic convergence in Ar-
gentina [Elías (1995); Elías and Fuentes (1998); Willington (1998); Utrera and Ko-
roch (1998; 2000); Garrido et al. (2002); Marina (2001); Ramón-Berjano (2002); 
Figueras et al. (2003); and Figueras et al. (2004)]. By and large, these studies reject 
the hypothesis of absolute convergence across Argentine provinces while they find 
some support for the conditional convergence hypothesis —i.e. the evidence suggests 
Argentine provinces tend to converge to their own stationary state—. In other words, 
once one accounts for control variables that reflect differences between the regions 
other than the level of the variable of interest in the convergence equation —this vari-
able is the literacy rate in Utrera and Koroch (2000) but often the investment-to-GDP 
ratio and the population growth rate are also used—, the coefficient for the GDP 
variable becomes significant 4. Somewhat surprisingly, none of these studies test the 
convergence hypotheses in relation with well-being standards which may be related 
not only with economic strength but also with the amount of federal transfers that the 
regions receive. 
This is all the more relevant since, in recent years, a growing number of studies 
have focused on convergence in well-being standards in various countries [Easterly 
(1999); Easterlin (2000); Kenny (2005); Branisa and Cardozo (2009) and Royuela 
and García (2010)] 5. We follow this line of work in this paper and add to this growing 
literature by presenting the Argentine case. Our main goal is to evaluate the extent 
to which public policy from the central government has contributed to alleviating 
regional disparities in well-being standards in Argentina. We are only aware of one 
previous study that analyses convergence in such terms. Porto (1994) finds evidence 
of absolute convergence in well-being indicators but no evidence of absolute con-
verge in income. Interestingly, the author finds a positive effect of redistribute fiscal 
policy on convergence in well-being measures. 
4 Other papers analyse convergence by different economic activities (Figueras et al., 2003 and 
Figueras et al., 2004) and also the extent to whether σ-convergence has taken place (Russo and Ceña 
Delgado, 2000).
5 It is often argued that the correlation between income measures and development measures is 
hardly straightforward and linear. Furthermore, some authors observe that while convergence in income 
has often proved difficult to achieve between developed and developing countries, the gaps in human 
development and well-being indicators have been gradually decreasing.
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3.  Tax-sharing and inter-governmental federal transfers  
in Argentina
Argentina is politically organized as a federal country with three tiers of govern-
ment: a central government (the federal level), 23 mid-level governments (the provin-
cial level) and 2259 local governments (the local level). Although technically a local 
government, the Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires is often considered as another 
mid-level jurisdiction due to its fiscal and political autonomy and to the fact that it has 
political representation in the national Congress. 
Inter-governmental financial relations in Argentina are articulated through a tax-
coordination scheme known as Régimen de Coparticipación Impositiva. Given that 
tax collection is highly centralized, while public expenditure is more evenly distrib-
uted between the three levels of government, this scheme introduces a mechanism of 
compensating the provinces and municipalities for the delegation of tax collection on 
the national level. In other words, this mechanism seeks to alleviate (at least partially) 
the vertical fiscal imbalance arising due to the mismatch between expenditure and 
revenue for the different levels of government. The principles governing the distribu-
tion of the Co-participation fund are outlined in the National Constitution, and reflect 
both devolutive —according to the distribution of public services between the differ-
ent levels— and redistributive —attending to differences in economic standards and 
development between the different sub-national units— criteria 6. Table 1 shows the 
evolution of the spending and revenue shares of the two levels of government for four 
years covering our period of analysis. It can be seen that despite significant fluctua-
tions in the federal and provincial shares, the vertical imbalance has been a persistent 
feature within the federal architecture. An example of these imbalances is the increas-
ing share of federal transfers into provincial current revenues, which in the 30 years 
period covered by our analysis increased by 12%, achieving more than 60% of total 
current revenues. This figures have increased even further in recent times.
In practice, there are several channels through which this tax-sharing system in-
troduces biases and distortions that conspire against the goals of narrowing both the 
vertical and horizontal fiscal gaps. Firstly, there are several important taxes which are 
not part of the tax-sharing scheme —most importantly export and import tariffs and 
labour taxes—; many others which are subject to significant deductions before adding 
6 The specific criteria and transfer shares are defined in the Ley Nacional 23548 which establishes 
two stages for the distribution of the Co-participation fund. The first stage, known as the primary distribu-
tion, specifies transfer shares for the Federal level (42.34%) and the Provincial level including the local 
level (56.66%). The remainder (1%) goes to the Federal level as part of a fund to meet extraordinary 
circumstances in the sub-national units. The second stage is known as the secondary distribution and 
specifies the share of each province within the amount allocated to the Provincial level. The coefficients 
for each province in the secondary distribution do not follow strictly criteria based on population or trans-
ferred competences but also incorporate a significant redistributive criterion. This means that rich and 
populated provinces like Buenos Aires, Cordoba, and Mendoza have coefficients smaller than their shares 
in the country population. 
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up to the Co-participation fund; and a few others which have a specific assignment. 
Secondly, there are strong underlying incentives to preserve the status quo concerning 
the redesign of the tax-sharing system attending to the past and present shortcomings 
of the system to overcome regional inequalities. These incentives are closely linked 
with the way political power is organized and distributed in federal Argentina. Finally, 
in the last 30 years, several public services have been decentralized to the provinces 
while the criteria and coefficients specified in the legal documents have not been 
modified to reflect the new situation. Moreover, some important new taxes have been 
introduced although the proceeds of its collection do not go into the resource pool 7.
Due to these provisions, the working of the tax-sharing system in Argentina is 
far from being a standardized and streamlined process. In fact, it is useful to under-
stand the tax-sharing system and particularly the «devolution» of taxes to provincial 
governments as involving two types of transfers from the national government: auto-
7 The vertical fiscal imbalance worsened in the late 70’s and throughout the 80’s, and even more 
during the 90’s when several important public services —health, education— were transferred from the 
nation to the provinces. While some de facto provisions were introduced into the tax-sharing scheme to 
further compensate the provinces for these new functions, in practice these fell short of achieving the goal 
of reducing the vertical fiscal imbalance. 
Table 1. Spending and revenue by level of government
Public expenditure (% GDP)
 Total Federal Provinces Provinces/Total
1970 23.75 15.76  7.99 33.64
1980 31.38 22.13  9.25 29.48
1990 27.96 19.12  8.84 31.62
2000 34.83 23.91 10.92 31.35
Public revenues (% GDP)
 Total Federal Provinces Provinces/Total
1970 21.93 17.50 4.43 20.20
1980 22.44 17.14 5.30 23.62
1990 18.24 14.11 4.13 22.64
2000 26.74 20.68 6.06 22.66
Provinces: % of Total current revenues (Constant 2001 values)
Own tax revenues
Own non-tax  
revenues
Total own current 
revenues
Transfers from  
Federal Government
1970 36.92 8.26 45.19 54.81
1980 35.22 11.01 46.23 53.77
1990 26.83 11.59 38.43 61.57
2000 28.41 10.00 38.41 61.59
Note: Exclude Municipalities and City of Buenos Aires. Source: Porto (2004).
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matic and non-automatic. Automatic transfers, in turn, can be general —tied to gen-
eral taxes and for general purpose-expenditures— or specific —tied to specific taxes 
and for specific expenditures—. In both cases, the distribution of these transfers is 
ruled by criteria established by law as discussed above. Non-automatic transfers, on 
the other hand, are not related with any general or specific taxes and are given out at 
the will of the ruling administration. Its distribution is essentially based on political 
criteria or on extraordinary circumstances. 
4. Fiscal transfers, public expenditure and the Dutch disease
As mentioned earlier, the evidence suggests that Argentina provinces are not con-
verging (in absolute terms) in economic conditions (Porto, 1994, 1996; Elías, 1995; 
Utrera and Koroch, 1998; Marina, 2001; and Ramón-Berjano, 2002). In fact, not only 
have most relevant studies failed to find a negative and significant sign for the β coef-
ficient, but also this can be quickly, albeit less rigorously, perceived from the trends 
presented in figure 1, where we present the evolution of three inequality measures of 
GDP per capita. After a reduction in the first half of the 1970s, all measures increased 
substantially until the mid/late eighties, after which there was an important reduction 
as the country was leaving behind a period of very high inflation which ended in an 
hyperinflation episode in 1989, and to a lesser extent another one in 1991. However, 
the reduction observed in the nineties was not large enough to compensate complete-
ly for the deterioration observed until the late eighties. This evidence would actually 
suggests that there has been a worsening in regional income inequalities over the last 
four decades, which is in line with all the previous literature cited earlier.
However, it is possible that, while the income gap between the provinces has not 
been reduced, provinces have come closer in terms of other indicators which may 
reflect well-being and living standards more adequately. This is particularly relevant 
to us in this paper since we are most interested in studying the role of public policy in 
helping overcome long-standing differences in development levels. More specifically, 
since federal public policy, in this paper measured strictly in terms of transfers per cap-
ita to the regional governments, is likely to affect public spending by the regional gov-
ernments, it is possible that some development variables —like infant mortality rates, 
educational levels and child undernourishment— are also affected to some extent.
Automatic transfers can be considered as a form of an unconditional grant to the 
governments in that there are no restrictions on how the money is ultimately allocated. 
But since they account for a large part of provincial revenues, these are often used 
to finance public expenditures and other purposes. However, even if these transfers 
increase public spending, there is no guarantee that they will effectively contribute to 
higher incomes or better living standards. Furthermore, the fact that these transfers are 
automatic and unconditional may pose additional problems due a possible weakening 
of accountability incentives by the provincial governments 8. Additionally, because of 
8 In this sense, other transfers, such as capital or extraordinary transfers, may be associated with 
greater external control and/or tighter accountability constraints. On the other hand, since these transfers 
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their nature, these transfers are designed to include some redistributive component in 
their allocation which is meant to reduce regional inequalities across various dimen-
sions; given that these transfers have been persistently higher for some of the poorer 
regions, it is desirable to analyse their effectiveness in terms of selected measures. 
The theoretical underpinnings of the previous considerations are rooted in the 
traditional literature of the so-called transfer paradox in a static setting (Brecher and 
Bhagwati, 1982; Bhagwati et al., 1983; Yano, 1983) and in a dynamic setting (Ga-
lor and Polemarchakis, 1987; Haaparanta, 1989; and Cremers and Sen, 2008) and 
the more recent political economy of federalism and inter-governmental transfers. A 
recent literature has also suggested that this phenomenon may be associated with a 
Dutch-disease-like phenomenon working at the sub-national level (McMahon, 1996; 
Paldam, 1997; Capello and Figueras, 2007). More specifically, we argue that it is pos-
sible that unconditional transfers from the central government are used in a way that 
provides spending capacity for the regional governments but affects the possibilities 
for long-term growth due to the adverse incentives it creates for private investment 
and production. One application of this phenomenon focusing on its impact on the re-
gional labour markets is Capello et al. (2009) who find that a higher level of transfers 
per capita increases the wage premium paid by the public sector relative to the private 
sector, which leaves the latter facing a stronger pressure in the regional job market.
As can be clearly seen from the scatter plot in figure 2, high transfers per capita 
are associated with higher current public expenditure and higher expenditure in per-
are often discretionary and, in many cases, politically motivated, the implications for accountability may 
not be that straightforward.
Figure 1. Inequality measures of provincial GDPs per capita 
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sonnel, although the relationship appears to have increased over time, and it looks like 
more evident in the case of Total Current Transfers 9. In table 2 we show the results 
9 Even an stronger positive correlation is found if transfers and expenditures are normalized by 
provinces’ GDP.
Figure 2. Transfers and Public Expenditure
Total Current Transfer (per inhabitant)
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from the estimation of a very parsimonious model of public expenditure on Federal 
transfers. As expected from the evidence in figure 2, in most cases there is a positive 
relationship between the two variables, with this relationship being significant when 
the model is estimated by Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) allowing for 
the presence of heteroskedasticity and an error structure with cross-section and/or 
AR(1) correlations 10. It is also possible to observe that the econometric results indi-
cates that over time there has been an increase in the degree of correlation between 
transfers and expenditures 11.
5. Methodology and data
There are essentially two different approaches to measuring convergence. The 
original approach, due to Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) and 
Sala-i-Martin (1996), is concerned with both β- and σ-convergence. This approach, 
also known as the classical approach to convergence tests for β-convergence by re-
gressing the average growth rate of the variable of interest on its initial value. A nega-
tive and significant coefficient indicates the existence of convergence 12. On the other 
hand, σ-convergence studies how the dispersion of the variable of interest evolves 
over time. If the coefficient of variation tends to decrease over time, there is evidence 
of σ-convergence. The second approach is known as the distributional approach to 
convergence and it originated with the work of Quah (1993, 1996, 1997). Rather than 
exploring measures of position and dispersion, this approach focuses on the distribu-
tional dynamics of the data. The specific methodology consists in estimating kernel 
densities for variables relative to the national average. 
Data come from different sources. Human development and well-being indica-
tors are from the Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda for the years 1970, 1980, 
1991 and 2001, and from the Dirección de Estadísticas e Información de Salud, Min-
isterio de Salud de la Nación. Data on transfers from the Federal Government to the 
Provinces are from the database compiled by the Economic Department of Universi-
dad Nacional de La Plata. A full description of variables, sources, and time coverage 
are in the Appendix A. In Appendix B there is a set of descriptive statistics.
Before testing for β-convergence using an econometric model, in table 3 we re-
port the evolution of the coefficient of variation for the different variables. In this 
case is possible to observe that the dispersion in the distribution has decreased over 
time for the cases of primary and secondary school enrolment, life expectancy, in-
fant mortality, household-owners, and housing overcrowding, while it has increased 
10 We thanks to an anonimus referee for sugesting thise approach.
11 The three dummy variables for the periods 1970-1979, 1980-1989, and 1990-2001, are calculated, 
roughly, one for each of the three decades covered by our analysis.
12 This approach is used to test for both absolute and conditional convergence. The β-convergence 
approach was initially derived from a neoclassical growth model, however its use has been widespread 
to analyze other variables without necessarily having a proper theoretical support. As mentioned earlier, 
examples for the case of convergence in well-being indicators are Easterly (1999), Easterlin (2000), Kenny 
(2005), Branisa and Cardozo (2009), and Royuela and García (2010). 
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for illiteracy, unsatisfied basics needs, maternal mortality, and deficient dwellings. 
It can also be observed that, aside from the cases of primary school enrolment and 
household-owners, there has been an increase in the dispersion for all the indicators 
from 1991 to 2001, despite the fact that the average per capita transfers during this 
period was higher for most of the provinces.
Table 3. Coefficients of variation and confidence intervals
1970 1980 1991 2001
Illiteracy rate
Cv 46.74 47.27 51.15 54.33
95% CI 35.36-57.82 34.66-61.70 38.69-66.63 41.15-70.75
Primary school enrolment 
ratio
Cv  5.15  2.97  2.12  1.29
95% CI 3.85-6.74 1.68-4.53 1.24-3.28 0.83-1.85
Secondary school 
enrolment ratio
Cv 24.76 15.30 14.38 14.24
95% CI 19.40-31.62 11.34-20-13 11.08-18.70 11.48-17.84
Life expectancy at birth
Cv   3.30  1.75  2.03
95% CI  2.54-4.24 1.40-2.20 1.60-2.60
Maternal mortality rate
Cv  48.48 67.37 75.32
95% CI  37.08-61.98 48.58-93.25 56.86-101.13
Infant mortality rate
Cv  26.35 22.01 29.05
95% CI  20.69-33.72 17.29-27.90 23.07-36.86
Unsatisfied basic needs
Cv  34.19 36.71 37.13
95% CI  25.18-44.57 29.85-45.41 30.89-45.14
Percentage of deficient 
dwellings
Cv  40.45 62.99 65.39
95% CI  32.62-50.16 32.25-112.90 47.97-90.05
Ratio of housing 
overcrowding
Cv  47.57 44.28 52.03
95% CI  36.62-60.90 33.28-56.93 41.66-64.90
Household-owners 
as percentage of total 
households
Cv  14.56  6.46   6.22
95%CI  12.11-17.58 5.44-7.83 4.85-7.98
The coefficient of variation is defined as the ration between the standard deviation and the arithmetic mean of the variable. 
Due to the small sample size, we report bootstrapped confidence intervals using a bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) 
percentile confidence approach. The number of replications is 999.
6. Testing for β-convergence
Although it is often customary to test for both absolute and conditional conver-
gence, in this paper we are mostly interested in testing for the latter 13. The reason 
13 In most cross-national convergence studies starting with Barro (1991), there are usually controls 
for variables that could potentially affect the steady states of different countries such as the ratio of invest-
ment to GDP, and the like.
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is that despite the fact that the distinction between absolute and conditional con-
vergence becomes less relevant at the state/regional level (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1992), there are sharp differences in the level of federal transfers to the Argentine 
provinces. Since these transfers are a key source of income for the provinces, it is 
likely that the level of transfers, particularly the average level of transfers to the re-
gion for a given period, could affect its steady state. 
Our baseline equation is a standard convergence equation expanded to include 
our variable of interest:
∆Y Y TRi t t j i t j i t j t t, , , , ,ln ln− − − += + ( ) + ( ) +α β γ φ1 + +η εi i t, ( )1
where DYi, t, t–j is the average annual growth rate of variable Y between censuses in 
years t and t–j for province i; Yi, t–j is the value of variable Y in the initial year t–j for 
province i; φt and ηi are time and province fixed effects, while ei,t is an error term. 
With regards to the Transfer variable, TRi,t–j+1, t is measured by the cumulated per 
capita transfers between t–j+1 and
 











In the two upper blocks of table 4 we report the estimates of equation (1) when 
using a fixed effect model. However, considering some of the criteria followed to dis-
tribute transfers among provinces, it could be the case that the level of transfers is not 
exogenous, so we estimate equation (1) also using an instrumental variable estima-
tor (IV). Taking into account the positive relationship between transfers and public 
expenditure as reported in table 2, we use total current expenditure and expenditure 
in personnel, per inhabitant, as instruments. The results from the IV estimations are 
reported in the two lower blocks of table 4. As we can see form the Hansen test, in 
almost all cases we do not reject the null about the validity of the instruments.
Prior to the interpretation of our results, it is important to note the different scaling 
and measurement of the human development variables. In some cases, as with primary 
and secondary school enrolment, life expectancy, and household-owners a higher value 
implies an improvement alongside these dimensions. For all the other cases, illiteracy, 
unsatisfied needs, maternal and infant mortality, deficient dwellings and housing over-
crowding since these measure the ratio of the population with specific deficits to the 
total population, a higher value implies a deterioration of this variable. This has impli-
cations for the interpretation of the coefficients. Firstly, for the β-coefficient, regardless 
of whether higher or lower values represent improvements, the regression coefficient 
on the initial value of the variable has to be negative for convergence to exist 14.
14 This can be illustrated with a simple example. Suppose Y is the variable we are interested 
in testing for convergence where a higher value implies a better performance. Then, convergence 
would require lower initial values for Y to be associated with higher positive growth rates (higher 
DY). Suppose now Y is a variable where a lower value implies a better performance. Then, conver-
gence would require higher initial values for Y to be associated with lower negative growth rates 
(lower −DY) —or higher growth rates in absolute value. In both cases, we see that the implied sign is 
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From table 4, we have that the β-coefficient in almost all the regressions is nega-
tive and statistically significant suggesting that provinces with initial worse standards 
of well-being and human development have improved at a faster pace than provinces 
with higher standards across these dimensions. With regards to the role of federal 
transfers, the results are much less robust, as well as there is a large heterogeneity 
across the different variables.
For the education variables, we expect a positive sign for the school enrolment 
rate (primary and secondary) variables and a negative one for the illiteracy rate. As 
reported in table 4, for the illiteracy rate, the estimated coefficients are almost always 
not significant, and also there is no clear pattern about their sign. For the school enrol-
ment variables, the coefficients are also mostly not statistically significant. Moreover, 
contrary to what is expected when they are significant the estimates are negative. 
With regards to the health variables, here we expect a positive sign for life expec-
tancy and a negative coefficient for maternal and infant mortality. For life expectancy, 
even when the coefficients are positive in 3 out of 4 cases, they are always not signifi-
cant. For maternal mortality in all cases, and in 2 out of 4 cases for infant mortality, 
we obtain the opposite sign, however they are mostly not significant, specially in the 
case of infant mortality.
For the housing variables, we expect a positive sign for the proportion of house-
hold-owners and a negative coefficient for the other three variables: unsatisfied basic 
needs, deficient dwellings and housing overcrowding. For unsatisfied basics needs 
there is no clear pattern with regard the sign of the coefficients, negative when using 
the FE estimator and positive when using the IV estimator, however in the only case 
we obtain a significant estimate, the coefficient is, as expected, negative. For housing 
overcrowding, once again, we do not have conclusive evidence about the direction of 
the effect played by federal transfers, with the four estimates rendering coefficients 
not statistically significant. For deficient dwellings, as in the case of unsatisfied basic 
needs, the results fail to produce coefficients with the same signs, positive when us-
ing a FE estimator and negative for the IV estimator, and in the only case the estimate 
is significant the coefficient is positive. Finally, for house hold-owners, 3 out of 4 
estimates are significant, but most important in the four cases we obtain, at odds with 
what is expected, a negative estimate.
A characteristic of socio-economic variables in Argentina, is the existence of a 
long-run and relatively stable regional pattern. Maps 1 to 10 show the value of each 
indicator for each province at the initial and final years of our sample. For each indi-
cator, provinces are grouped into five quintiles. As it is possible to observe, there is a 
relative clear regional structure, with north-west and north-east provinces showing the 
worst performance. For the largest provinces, Buenos Aires (BUE), Córdoba (CBA), 
Mendoza (MZA), and Santa Fe (SFE), their rankings usually put them among those 
negative. Now, suppose X is a control variable, as public transfers in our case. If Y is a variable where 
a higher value implies a better performance, then a positive coefficient on X implies that a higher X 
is associated with a higher (positive) DY (improvements in Y over time). Contrarily, if Y is a variable 
where a lower value implies a better performance, then a negative coefficient on X implies that a 
higher X is associated with a lower (negative) DY (improvements in Y over time).
48 Capello, M., Figueras, A., Freille, S. y Moncarz, P.
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with a better performance, while the City of Buenos Aires (CABA) is in almost all 
cases among those with the best indicators. The southern provinces, Chubut (CHU), 
La Pampa (LPA), Neuquén (NQN), Río Negro (RNG), Santa Cruz (SCR) and Tierra 
del Fuego (TDF) show the most important improvements between the initial and fi-
nal years of our sample, while for the remaining provinces (centre-east, centre-west) 
their relative positions vary according to the indicator we look at.
To take into account for this apparent regional behaviour, we estimate also the 
following panel data spatial error model (SEM):









where W is a spatial matrix for the idiosyncratic error component. The matrix W is 
constructed using geospatial data, more specifically a dataset that contains the coor-
dinates for the boundaries for 21 provinces. Due to the lack of data for Chubut and 
Tierra del Fuego, these two provinces are excluded from the model.
In table 5 we report the results from the SEM model. As in the case of the other 
two estimators, we obtain evidence of conditional convergence, with the estimates 
being significant in all cases. With regards to the role of transfers from the Fed-
eral Government to the provinces, we obtain coefficients that are statistically sig-
nificant in the case of primary and secondary school enrolment, unsatisfied basic 
needs, maternal mortality, deficient dwellings, and household-owners. However, in 
line with the previous results, in all but one occasion, deficient dwellings when using 
co-participation transfers, the coefficients have the opposite sign to what would be 
expected.15
Map 1. Illiteracy rate 15 Map 2. Primary school enrolment rate
1970 2001 1970 2001
15 See Table A.2 in Appendix A for a description of the codes corresponding to the name of each 
province.
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Map 3. Secondary school  
enrolment rate
Map 4. Life expectancy
1970 2001 1980 2001
Map 5. Infant mortality  
rate
Map 6. Maternal mortality  
rate
1980 2001 1980 2001
Map 7. Unsatisfied basic  
needs rate
Map 8. Percentage of deficient 
dwellings
1980 2001 1980 2001
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Map 9. Housing overcrowding  
rate
Map 10. Household-owners as 
percentage of total households
1970 2001 1970 2001
7. Concluding remarks
There are several conclusions that we draw from the analysis in this study. Firstly, 
the evidence suggests that there has been a convergence process between the Argen-
tine provinces in the levels of different socio-economic and well-being standards. 
Although the evidence suggests that there is absolute convergence in some indicators, 
we found better support for the hypothesis that provinces have tended to converge to 
their own stationary states.
Concerning the role of public policy towards regional governments, the evidence 
suggests that federal fiscal transfers have not had most of an impact on the rates at 
which provinces improve their well-being standards. In fact, if anything, we find 
that fiscal transfers are negatively correlated with these improvement rates for a few 
indicators. This seems to be the case with some educational variables (primary and 
secondary school enrolment rates), health-related (rate of maternal mortality) and 
housing standards (deficient dwellings and household-owners rates). 
These results provide partial support to our theoretical presumption on the nega-
tive effects of transfers per capita. Regardless of any positive spillovers effects as-
sociated with untied current transfers per capita to the provinces (possibly through 
greater spending capacity due to higher public employment and wages), the evidence 
presented here does not seem to support the idea that fiscal federal transfers are al-
located to the type of public spending that improves well-being and human develop-
ment in a long-run perspective. However, they left us without a convincing empirical 
explanation behind the convergence process that we find for all the variables we con-
sidered here. Among possible plausible explanations, it is the role of conditional tied 
cash transfers, such as funding from the Federal government for specific programs 
aimed at improving welfare indicators, particularly to benefit those jurisdictions with 
lower levels of development. Also, since the 1990s current transfers have lost impor-
tance at the expense of capital transfers, over which provinces have a lower degree of 
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autonomy when deciding about its use. Unfortunately we do not have access to these 
types of transfers for a period of time as we have discussed here.
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Appendix A 
A.1. Variable definitions, description, and data sources
Variable Definition Period Source
Illiteracy rate
Percentage of population aged 14 or 








Ratio of population between 6 and 12 
years attending primary school to total 








Ratio of total enrolled students in sec-







Estimated average life expectancy of 
newborns from a given population at a 
given year This calculation holds mortal-







Defined as the ratio of the number of 
maternal deaths during pregnancy and 




ticas e Información de 
Salud, Ministerio de 
Salud de la Nación
Infant mortality 
rate
Ratio of the number of deaths of child 





ticas e Información de 
Salud, Ministerio de 
Salud de la Nación
Unsatisfied basic 
needs
Percentage of households with any of the 
following: 1) Overcrowding in housing 
conditions -more than three (3) persons 
per room; 2) Deficient dwellings; 3) 
Deficient sanitary conditions; 4) School 
non-attendance -at least one child aged 







Ratio of the number of deficient dwell-
ings (shacks, tents, mobile homes) to the 







Ratio of households with more than three 










Ratio of households whose members 
have ownership of both dwelling and 






Transfers per capita. Defined as the amount 
of resources transferred from the National 
to the regional level corresponding to the 
Regímen de Coparticipación and Total 
Current Transfers in prices of 2001.
1970-2001
Departamento de Eco-
nomía de la Univer-
sidad Nacional de La 
Plata
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A.2. Codes used in Maps 1 to 10
Province Name CODE  Province Name CODE  Province Name CODE
Buenos Aires BUE  Jujuy JUJ  San Juan SJU
Catamarca CAT  La Pampa LPA  San Luis SLU
Chaco CHA  La Rioja LRI  Santa Cruz SCR
Chubut CHU  Mendoza MZA  Santa Fe SFE
Corrientes COR  Misiones MIS  Santiago del Estero SGO
Córdoba CBA  Neuquén NQN  Tierra del Fuego TDF
Entre Ríos ERI  Río Negro RNG  Tucumán TUC
Formosa FOR  Salta SAL
The role of federal transfers in regional convergence in human development indicators... 59
Investigaciones Regionales, 27 (2013) – Páginas 33 a 63
Appendix B 








































































































1970 11.75 85.14 3.55 231.27
1980 9.36 92.64 4.70 67.31 9.18 37.66 31.97 10.39 13.27 59.93 424.02
1991 5.90 95.38 7.32 70.67 7.16 25.43 22.61 3.52 10.10 65.18 514.60
2001 4.07 94.60 6.26 73.19 6.42 17.33 17.83 3.88 6.36 74.51 473.78
Overall 7.71 91.94 5.46 70.39 7.59 26.81 24.14 5.93 9.91 66.54 410.92
Minimum
1970 3.20 74.60 2.25 90.72
1980 2.40 83.30 3.16 64.18 1.80 20.30 18.80 4.79 5.82 45.40 161.50
1991 1.20 88.50 5.71 68.37 2.20 15.60 12.00 2.03 4.00 58.71 153.26
2001 0.70 90.90 4.88 69.97 1.00 10.10 9.20 1.25 1.79 66.88 147.91
Overall 0.70 74.60 2.25 64.18 1.00 10.10 9.20 1.25 1.79 45.40 90.72
Maximum
1970 20.90 90.80 4.80 595.42
1980 17.70 95.50 5.67 71.28 17.40 54.20 46.80 18.36 25.54 74.10 922.61
1991 12.30 98.10 9.82 72.79 21.80 33.20 34.30 12.91 18.10 73.50 916.26
2001 9.00 96.20 8.17 75.24 19.70 28.90 28.00 12.15 13.26 85.39 1157.69
Overall 20.90 98.10 9.82 75.24 21.80 54.20 46.80 18.36 25.54 85.39 1157.69
Standard 
Deviation
1970 5.07 4.25 0.77 102.02
1980 4.03 2.71 0.65 1.98 4.29 9.09 9.53 3.95 5.72 8.82 181.36
1991 2.77 2.05 1.07 1.20 4.57 5.21 7.57 2.23 4.06 4.29 216.99
2001 2.05 1.23 0.88 1.42 4.62 4.79 6.21 2.56 3.12 4.59 223.13
Overall 4.67 4.91 1.68 2.88 4.58 10.67 9.77 4.35 5.21 8.65 214.02
Skewness
1970 0.19 –0.70 0.12 1.89
1980 0.29 –1.85 –0.50 0.38 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.38 0.34 0.12 1.14
1991 0.57 –1.78 0.61 0.01 1.47 –0.11 0.31 3.42 0.34 0.18 0.45
2001 0.69 –1.22 0.47 –0.44 1.56 0.75 0.45 1.61 0.67 0.26 1.29
Overall 0.88 –1.37 0.23 –0.33 0.95 0.71 0.60 1.14 0.77 –0.39 1.05
Note: see Table in A.1 in Appendix A for a description of variables, units of measure and sources.
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Mean 3.30 92.45 5.39 72.01 2.87 22.53 15.87 5.55 5.82 74.22 147.16
Minimum 1.70 88.20 3.89 69.96 2.10 15.00 13.00 2.08 3.98 71.38 125.97
Maximum 5.00 96.40 6.75 73.99 4.30 28.40 19.90 9.94 7.57 78.02 161.50
St. Deviation 1.48 4.06 1.52 2.01 1.24 6.85 3.59 4.01 1.79 3.42 15.19





Mean 6.55 91.33 6.07 70.37 8.40 29.73 26.87 4.72 11.05 73.43 635.89
Minimum 3.20 80.20 4.46 67.11 3.70 15.50 18.40 2.06 7.48 69.71 280.28
Maximum 9.50 95.20 7.62 73.38 13.60 41.90 37.60 8.11 14.28 79.90 916.26
St. Deviation 2.99 7.42 1.38 3.14 4.97 13.32 9.80 3.09 3.41 5.62 274.39




Mean 14.98 84.80 4.46 67.92 13.90 36.83 35.20 5.46 16.04 65.88 383.56
Minimum 9.00 74.60 2.68 64.77 11.80 24.00 27.60 2.61 10.32 54.50 170.73
Maximum 20.90 92.80 5.80 69.97 15.90 54.20 44.80 10.67 21.29 77.92 522.28
St. Deviation 5.34 7.83 1.46 2.77 2.05 15.60 8.77 4.52 5.50 11.72 155.59




Mean 4.25 91.48 5.70 69.82 4.40 22.33 20.87 7.06 9.11 61.33 361.68
Minimum 3.50 82.80 3.22 66.71 2.30 13.10 13.40 2.62 4.95 50.60 264.78
Maximum 5.00 96.60 7.90 72.16 8.50 34.80 29.80 15.40 12.79 71.55 436.55
St. Deviation 1.06 6.25 2.20 2.81 3.55 11.21 8.30 7.23 3.94 10.49 72.53





Mean 12.93 90.30 5.14 69.30 8.03 32.20 30.50 5.72 13.11 66.36 345.84
Minimum 7.20 83.00 3.70 65.79 5.40 23.50 24.00 3.14 8.66 58.50 242.99
Maximum 18.30 94.20 6.23 72.03 9.80 44.60 40.60 9.29 17.77 74.81 410.71
St. Deviation 5.08 5.11 1.08 3.19 2.32 11.03 8.87 3.19 4.56 8.17 72.16




Mean 4.60 94.43 5.60 72.99 3.20 20.90 14.43 3.23 5.27 65.81 227.81
Minimum 2.30 90.30 4.80 71.28 2.40 16.20 11.10 1.60 3.86 61.30 128.26
Maximum 7.00 96.60 7.15 74.90 4.80 24.20 19.40 5.82 6.34 69.43 282.11
St. Deviation 2.10 2.82 1.06 1.82 1.39 4.18 4.38 2.27 1.27 4.14 69.87
Skewness 0.05 –0.99 1.02 0.20 0.71 –0.55 0.59 0.64 –0.45 –0.38 –0.85
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Mean 6.93 93.03 5.40 71.37 4.70 24.63 19.93 4.52 7.45 71.01 325.23
Minimum 3.40 87.70 3.93 68.43 4.20 14.90 14.70 2.39 4.70 68.00 171.69
Maximum 10.60 95.90 6.94 74.08 5.20 35.80 27.90 8.00 10.06 76.08 420.67
St. Deviation 3.17 3.66 1.26 2.83 0.50 10.52 7.01 3.04 2.68 4.42 111.58





Mean 12.10 89.18 5.03 68.86 16.20 30.50 36.37 7.66 18.97 65.22 554.28
Minimum 6.80 78.40 2.25 66.41 12.90 24.50 28.00 3.44 13.26 47.20 239.11
Maximum 18.60 94.20 7.33 70.80 21.80 38.10 46.80 15.65 25.54 79.22 803.16
St. Deviation 5.19 7.46 2.18 2.24 4.88 6.94 9.57 6.93 6.19 16.38 250.17
Skewness 0.30 –0.92 –0.32 –0.40 0.67 0.40 0.38 0.70 0.25 –0.42 –0.33
Ju
juy
Mean 11.15 93.10 6.55 68.35 15.00 34.33 34.93 10.34 14.69 61.73 383.83
Minimum 5.40 86.90 2.79 64.18 10.40 18.40 26.10 5.18 10.48 51.80 277.59
Maximum 18.10 95.90 9.82 72.50 19.70 51.40 45.10 18.36 18.18 71.65 487.43
St. Deviation 5.66 4.17 3.02 4.16 4.65 16.53 9.57 7.04 3.90 9.92 93.98





Mean 5.70 93.48 5.04 71.59 6.27 21.07 13.33 2.74 4.22 71.89 521.82
Minimum 3.00 87.70 3.03 68.43 3.40 12.40 9.20 1.27 2.34 69.18 319.57
Maximum 8.60 96.30 6.55 74.78 7.90 30.30 18.80 4.79 5.82 74.98 634.91
St. Deviation 2.46 3.94 1.69 3.18 2.49 8.96 4.94 1.83 1.75 2.92 139.53




Mean 5.80 93.38 6.02 70.05 5.33 32.17 24.20 4.41 9.65 74.16 614.67
Minimum 2.70 88.90 4.40 67.22 1.80 23.50 17.40 3.20 7.06 69.14 310.73
Maximum 9.30 95.80 7.95 72.54 10.80 45.80 31.60 6.59 11.79 79.25 824.56
St. Deviation 2.91 3.06 1.49 2.68 4.80 11.95 7.12 1.89 2.40 5.06 216.70





Mean 6.48 92.55 5.50 72.75 5.20 22.50 16.27 3.22 6.16 63.08 235.93
Minimum 3.60 85.70 4.42 70.58 3.90 12.10 13.10 1.63 4.50 60.70 190.07
Maximum 9.50 96.30 7.01 74.95 6.00 31.80 20.40 5.98 7.10 66.88 259.51
St. Deviation 2.67 4.77 1.25 2.18 1.14 9.90 3.74 2.40 1.44 3.33 31.14
Skewness 0.06 –0.89 0.27 0.03 –0.65 –0.20 0.44 0.68 –0.69 0.64 –1.03
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Mean 11.28 88.60 4.57 69.25 8.47 34.53 30.90 7.98 10.70 64.63 298.57
Minimum 6.70 80.60 2.66 65.57 5.30 19.60 23.50 3.54 6.16 52.10 193.67
Maximum 16.40 92.40 5.71 72.69 10.80 51.90 39.20 14.60 14.54 77.21 368.05
St. Deviation 4.26 5.40 1.39 3.57 2.84 16.29 7.89 5.84 4.23 12.55 74.10





Mean 8.80 91.78 5.53 71.59 4.93 20.10 22.83 6.34 11.01 62.94 370.02
Minimum 3.90 82.50 2.79 68.13 1.00 13.00 15.50 3.58 5.11 54.10 306.24
Maximum 14.80 96.90 7.91 75.24 7.60 31.70 33.90 11.24 17.13 71.92 440.19
St. Deviation 4.86 6.54 2.36 3.56 3.48 10.13 9.75 4.25 6.01 8.91 58.64





Mean 8.78 91.08 5.24 70.82 3.17 24.83 23.20 6.86 10.39 61.98 368.27
Minimum 4.20 80.70 2.83 67.73 2.60 14.70 16.10 3.43 4.84 56.40 235.30
Maximum 14.50 96.90 7.43 73.86 3.60 35.70 32.80 13.29 16.23 70.10 437.66
St. Deviation 4.56 7.35 2.17 3.07 0.51 10.52 8.63 5.57 5.70 7.19 92.65
Skewness 0.32 –0.80 –0.09 –0.03 –0.45 0.13 0.49 0.70 0.09 0.57 –0.89
Sa
lta
Mean 10.30 91.10 6.40 68.46 12.10 34.70 34.60 9.60 15.74 60.91 322.41
Minimum 5.20 82.90 4.08 64.58 6.50 19.10 27.50 4.82 11.95 52.10 215.39
Maximum 16.00 94.50 9.13 71.88 17.40 52.10 42.40 16.81 19.05 70.89 388.98
St. Deviation 4.84 5.50 2.25 3.67 5.46 16.57 7.47 6.36 3.57 9.45 75.27





Mean 6.15 92.65 5.61 70.87 7.80 24.50 19.17 4.38 7.55 64.82 420.97
Minimum 3.20 86.60 3.44 67.84 5.80 18.80 14.30 1.61 5.58 61.39 232.15
Maximum 8.90 96.20 7.90 73.63 8.90 30.10 26.00 9.46 9.47 70.27 561.99
St. Deviation 2.65 4.18 1.85 2.90 1.73 5.65 6.09 4.41 1.95 4.77 146.17




Mean 6.13 92.73 5.52 71.06 8.80 27.87 19.80 4.31 7.49 67.65 513.93
Minimum 3.20 87.70 4.58 68.32 6.00 17.80 13.00 2.19 4.58 61.12 263.27
Maximum 8.40 95.20 6.48 74.06 13.80 37.20 27.70 7.08 8.98 75.24 700.38
St. Deviation 2.59 3.40 0.78 2.88 4.34 9.72 7.41 2.51 2.52 7.12 184.24
Skewness –0.16 –1.05 0.04 0.17 0.69 –0.14 0.27 0.44 –0.71 0.27 –0.55
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Mean 3.48 94.93 6.06 69.64 6.73 22.93 16.00 5.80 5.60 58.92 749.24
Minimum 1.60 90.70 2.86 65.57 6.10 14.50 10.10 3.40 2.97 51.00 595.42
Maximum 5.80 97.70 9.15 72.93 7.10 34.40 22.70 10.59 7.94 67.05 869.72
St. Deviation 1.87 2.98 2.66 3.74 0.55 10.29 6.34 4.15 2.50 8.03 114.73




Mean 4.98 93.60 5.42 72.31 5.37 23.60 15.30 3.75 6.23 71.78 233.51
Minimum 2.70 88.70 4.63 70.47 3.10 14.30 11.90 2.03 4.14 69.36 145.28
Maximum 7.20 96.20 6.54 74.17 8.30 34.30 20.00 6.88 8.14 75.48 280.72
St. Deviation 2.05 3.39 0.94 1.85 2.66 10.07 4.20 2.71 2.01 3.26 63.14








o Mean 11.68 91.43 4.25 69.12 9.47 26.37 35.20 3.06 14.63 72.76 397.66
Minimum 6.60 86.80 2.93 66.01 7.10 14.80 26.20 1.25 9.97 59.40 151.97
Maximum 16.70 93.30 6.03 71.53 13.10 35.10 45.80 5.24 19.91 85.39 540.43
St. Deviation 4.50 3.09 1.47 2.83 3.19 10.44 9.90 2.02 5.00 13.01 170.87







o Mean 1.88 95.05 5.78 70.19 15.70 22.20 12.54 4.11 61.09 749.06
Minimum 0.70 90.80 3.24 65.57 10.10 15.50 12.15 1.79 45.40 90.72
Maximum 3.20 98.10 8.17 74.84 20.30 25.60 12.91 6.53 72.12 1157.69
St. Deviation 1.14 3.09 2.70 4.63 5.17 5.80 0.38 2.37 13.96 460.55





Mean 7.40 92.25 5.23 70.28 6.60 31.70 27.23 7.17 12.95 68.85 289.78
Minimum 3.90 85.80 3.97 67.40 3.60 24.50 20.50 2.56 7.51 60.50 168.03
Maximum 11.20 95.10 6.94 72.42 10.40 42.00 36.60 12.73 19.03 78.47 366.15
St. Deviation 3.35 4.33 1.24 2.59 3.47 9.15 8.37 5.15 5.79 9.05 86.39
Skewness 0.09 –1.11 0.60 –0.48 0.40 0.55 0.52 0.33 0.20 0.25 –0.77
Note: see Table in A.1 in Appendix A for a description of variables, units of measure and sources.
